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The paper discusses the design of optimal regulatory policies under an al-
ternative analytical framework of unbounded and bounded rationality, by con-
sidering the mechanism that provides the type of the optimal CAP instruments
that ensure the collective attainment of a social environmental target, along
with the type of interdependence characterizing them. The problem of the op-
timal regulation of an unboundedly rational population of farmers is discussed
in both a static and a dynamic context. The long-run viability of the Agenda
2000 CAP reform is also examined under the assumption of bounded rational-
ity by employing the evolutionary framework of replicator dynamics. Analysis
indicated that.it may be socially desirable on environmental grounds not only
to maintain coupled payments but also to impose on farmers a set of charges on
the various aspects of farming activity.
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11 Introduction
Despite their bene￿cial environmental services, European agriculture is associ-
ated with a series of adverse environmental e⁄ects.2 Among the factors creating
the unbalance between agriculture and environment, CAP measures are consid-
ered of primary importance.3 Supports linked with output levels (coupled pay-
ments) increased production to levels that would not have occurred otherwise,
resulting into intensi￿cation, specialization, expansion of cultivated areas and
rise in livestock numbers (Baldock et al., 2002). Even though coupled payments
have not yet been cancelled by EU market policy (Pillar I), the Commission
circularly admitted in 1988 that such a price policy is liable for environmental
damages (Fennel, 1997) and decided to reorganize CAP as a response to the
wider demand for an environmentally oriented CAP.
The major element of the 1992 or McSharry CAP reform was the gradual
reduction or even elimination of production subsidies and the introduction of
direct aid payments, provided per hectare (decoupling) to compensate farmers
for support price cuts (EC, 2003). The substitution of price support measures
by decoupled payments was continued by the 1999 or Agenda 2000 reform,
which makes direct aid payments conditional to environmental aims (i.e. hor-
izontal regulation). A long-term set-aside mechanism4 was proposed and a
package of rural development measures (Pillar II)5 was promoted to comple-
ment reforms of common market organizations (CMOs) and internalize major
environmental considerations. To maximize environmental bene￿ts, both direct
and pillar II payments are subject to the cross-compliance principle, a sanction-
ing approach incorporated in horizontal regulation that involves proportionate
penalties for environmental infringements entailing, where appropriate, partial
or full removal of aid in the event of deviation from certain farming standards
(EC, 1999). Finally, dynamic modulation involves the transfer of funds released
2Among the bene￿cial services are classi￿ed the decline of greenhouse emissions and the
gains to biodiversity, while among the adverse services are the loss of landscape diversity
and quality, as well as the deterioration of important habitats. For further details about the
bene￿cial and adverse environmental services of agriculture, see Baldock et al. (2002).
3The driving forces of such an unbalance are: (i) changes in market conditions (i.e. input
prices), (ii) commercial considerations (i.e. pro￿t maximization), (iii) institutional changes,
(iv) technology development, (v) economic and social changes in rural areas (i.e. cost of labour,
population mobility), (vi) independent and partly endogenous environmental changes (i.e.
global warming), as well as (vii) public policy measures of CAP or in di⁄erent policy realms
(i.e. land ownership, food safety) (Baldock et al., 2002). Furthermore, among the factors
that contribute to agricultural pollution are also classi￿ed the imperfect knowledge about the
(i) land attributes (i.e. soil moisture and fertility level) (Johnson et al., 1991), (ii) location
physical attributes (Wu and Babcock, 2001), as well as (iii) the operating characteristics of
the activity (i.e. farming experience, education) (Wu and Babcock, 2001).
4Farmers setting-aside their arable land for ten years are eligible for direct payments de-
pendent on this requirement. Non-food crops (i.e. energy crops) can be cultivated on this
land (EC, 2004a).
5Under Pillar II, aid is provided for (i) early retirement, (ii) set-up of young farmers, (iii)
rea⁄orestation of agricultural land, (iv) compensatory payments for mountainous and other
less-favoured areas, (v) agri-environmental programs, (vi) vocational training, (vii) improv-
ing processing and marketing of agricultural products, and (viii) investment in agricultural
holdings (EC, 2004a).
2from the compulsory reduction of market policy payments to rural development
measures contributing to environmentally benign practices. The reforms were
strengthened by the 2003 or Mid-term review CAP reform, which introduced
a single payment scheme based on direct payments received during the period
2000-2002 and the hectares entitled for those payments, as well as rede￿ning the
cross-compliance principle to make it dependent on the detected noncompliance
type (EC, 2004b).6
The major element of the 1992 or McSharry CAP reform was the gradual
reduction or even elimination of production subsidies and the introduction of
direct aid payments, provided per hectare (decoupling) to compensate farmers
for support price cuts (EC, 2003). The substitution of price support measures
by decoupled payments was continued by the 1999 or Agenda 2000 reform,
which makes direct aid payments conditional to environmental aims (i.e. hor-
izontal regulation). A long-term set-aside mechanism7 was proposed and a
package of rural development measures (Pillar II)8 was promoted to comple-
ment reforms of common market organizations (CMOs) and internalize major
environmental considerations. To maximize environmental bene￿ts, both direct
and pillar II payments are subject to the cross-compliance principle, a sanction-
ing approach incorporated in horizontal regulation that involves proportionate
penalties for environmental infringements entailing, where appropriate, partial
or full removal of aid in the event of deviation from certain farming standards
(EC, 1999). Finally, dynamic modulation involves the transfer of funds released
from the compulsory reduction of market policy payments to rural development
measures contributing to environmentally benign practices. The reforms were
strengthened by the 2003 or Mid-term review CAP reform, which introduced
a single payment scheme based on direct payments received during the period
2000-2002 and the hectares entitled for those payments, as well as rede￿ning the
cross-compliance principle to make it dependent on the detected noncompliance
type (EC, 2004b).9
Agenda 2000 is known as the "Green CAP" because of the belief that it
brings greater quality to environmental integration. However, the theoretical
analysis of this regime has been rather limited and its environmental impacts
have not yet been fully assessed to justify such a characterization. Hence, the
intention of this paper is to evaluate the e⁄ectiveness of the given CAP re-
6Particularly, if a farmer fails to comply with standards due to negligence, then the reduc-
tion of payments varies between 5% and 15%, while payments are reduced by at least 20%
and may also be completely withdrawn in the event of deliberate noncompliance.
7Farmers setting-aside their arable land for ten years are eligible for direct payments de-
pendent on this requirement. Non-food crops (i.e. energy crops) can be cultivated on this
land (EC, 2004a).
8Under Pillar II, aid is provided for (i) early retirement, (ii) set-up of young farmers, (iii)
rea⁄orestation of agricultural land, (iv) compensatory payments for mountainous and other
less-favoured areas, (v) agri-environmental programs, (vi) vocational training, (vii) improv-
ing processing and marketing of agricultural products, and (viii) investment in agricultural
holdings (EC, 2004a).
9Particularly, if a farmer fails to comply with standards due to negligence, then the reduc-
tion of payments varies between 5% and 15%, while payments are reduced by at least 20%
and may also be completely withdrawn in the event of deliberate noncompliance.
3form to stimulate compliance of an entire population of either unboundedly or
boundedly rational farmers with a socially desirable environmental target. This
is achieved by considering the mechanism that provides the type of the CAP
instruments, along with the type of interdependence characterizing them which
guarantees the achievement of such a target.10 To do so a conceptual, theoreti-
cal framework describing farming behaviour under the Agenda 2000 provisions
is developed, by considering a homogeneous population of farmers where each
farmer is eligible for a production subsidy and two types of direct payments
provided for alternative land treatments: (i) cultivation and (ii) set-aside. The
given ￿nancial provisions are granted to each European farmer through a pub-
lic voluntary program,11 in the form of a formal contract between the entitled
farmer and the Commission. Given the attainment costs of environmental re-
quirements incorporated in direct payments, two strategies are considered: com-
pliance with and deviation from farming standards. A deviating strategy can be
detected via random inspections,12 given the non-point-source characteristics of
agricultural pollution, and deterred via the enforcement of the cross-compliance
principle.
The socially optimum CAP measures under the common market organiza-
tions are obtained by a system comparing the solution of the optimal regulator
with the solutions of the deviating, optimum farmer in a static context. Given
that the number of instruments is higher than the number of externalities opti-
mal CMOs CAP measures are de￿ned for ￿xed values of the rest CAP measures.
The type of interdependence between the various CAP measures and the opti-
mal measure, as well as the conditions under which a particular CAP regime is
optimal to occur are respectively provided. After de￿ning the dynamic socially
optimum CAP measures the e⁄ectiveness of Agenda 2000 is also assessed under
an evolutionary context. The framework of replicator dynamics is employed to
examine whether the reformed CAP can induce the majority, or even all the
farmers to adopt a "greener" behavior relative to the previous CAP regimes,
and de￿ne the type and the range of values of the various CAP instruments
that render feasible the attainment of such a target.As previously, the problem
of the optimal regulation is discussed both in a static and dynamic context to
assess the type of socially optimal rural development (RD) CAP measures.
The assessment of the socially optimum CMOs and RD CAP regimes both in
static and dynamic context indicated that it may be socially desirable not only
to maintain coupled payments but also to extend the compliance enforcement
mechanism with a set of charges on either crop yields, land-usage, set-aside-land
10Under unbounded rationality agents adopt an optimizing behavioural rule and behave as if
they had all the necessary data and skills to calculate the optimum response (Binmore, 1992),
while under bounded rationality agents have imperfect information about payo⁄s, they are
unable to compute the optimal strategy and choose between predetermined strategies (Noailly
et al., 2003).
11For further details about the elements of the particular voluntary programs,
see EC (2004b; 2007) or visit the o¢ cial site of the European Commission:
www.europa.eu/pol/agr/index_en.htm
12The simultaneous inspection of the entire population of farmers within a given geograph-
ical region is a technically very demanding task and potentially prohibitively costly.
4and / or secondary production choices. Given the current structure of CAP such
measures are not foreseen and hence both Agenda 2000 and Mid-term review
are ex-ante suboptimal. The suboptimality assertion is further supported by the
fact that the attainment of ￿rst-best solutions requires both nonuniform and
time-￿ exible Pillar I and Pillar II CAP measures that however are practically
infeasible given the high informational or / and administrative requirements they
involve. Henceforth, the answer to the question ￿ ￿ whether Agenda 2000 CAP
regime is indeed ￿greener￿compared to the previous CAP regimes￿￿is uncertain
and conditional to the characteristics of the given crop type. A further deepening
and extension of the communal agricultural policy is rendered necessary so that
given environmental targets are achieved in both static and dynamic context.
...
2 Model













is the fraction of gross land used for cultivation and bF
i the
remaining fraction voluntarily set aside (non-production case). For simplicity ￿
1 ￿ bF
i
￿ ￿ Li = Lc
i.
Crop yields are given by:
yi = f(xij;Lc
i) (1)
where xij is the vector of input choices among a set of j = 1;:::;m inputs.13




that is positively correlated to production.14
In the absence of regulatory intervention the payo⁄ function is:
￿i = Pf(xij;Lc
i) ￿ wjxij
where P is the output price and wj the vector of input prices in the competitive
market respectively.15
13It holds fx;fLc > 0 and fxx;fLcLc < 0, indicating that crop yields are increasing both
in input and land usage, whilst display diminishing returns in both x and Lc. It is considered
that xij and Lc are complements, in the sense that fxLc > 0, a fact that involves that the
marginal product of x is increasing to increases of Lc. Alternatively fbF < 0 and fbF bF < 0.
14It holds ex;eLc > 0 and exx;eLcLc > 0, with exLc > 0 given that xij and Lc are treated
as complements. Alternatively ebF < 0 and ebF > 0.
15Land is not included in the vector since it is owned by the farmer.
5Under Agenda 2000 the given crop is eligible both for a production subsidy
(s) and two types of direct aid payments (DPs) coupled with the alternative
and con￿ icting land usages, distinguished into:
- A direct payment DP1 granted on the basis of cultivated land
Lc






where ￿1 is the premium provided per hectare of cultivated land.
- A direct payment DP2 granted on the basis of set-aside land
￿￿ Li ￿ Lc
i
￿
: DP2 = ￿2




where ￿2 is the premium granted per hectare of set-aside land and
￿￿ Li ￿ Lc
i
￿
the size of the voluntarily set-aside land. The Commission has de￿ned a










Based on the horizontal regulation, direct payments are conditional on en-
vironmental requirements:
- DP1 is subject to an individual land quality standard, assumed to be
expressed by the following constraint:
Qi(e1;e2;:::;en) ￿ ￿ Qi (3)
where Qi is a decreasing function of emissions￿￿ ows17 indicating the possi-
bility of strategic interactions among farmers within a geographical area.
A typical example of such interaction is the upstream and downstream
farmer.18
- DP2 is conditional to a land usage constraint:
bF ￿ bR or Lc
i ￿ ~ Lc (4)
where the constraint constant ~ Lc = (1 ￿ bR)￿ Li represents the maximum
permissible size of cultivated land.
Incentives not to attain environmental requirements arise from the non-
point-source character of agricultural pollution. The fact that individual pro-
duction choices are not directly observed by a third party (i.e. regulator) allows
16The additional range can be eligible for a DP through an RD program, providing com-
pensation for the a⁄orestation of agricultural land (EC, 2004a).
17Given that Qei;Qeiei < 0 it holds that Qx;QLc < 0 and Qxx;QLcLc < 0, with QxLc > 0.
Alternatively, QbF > 0 and QbF bF < 0.
18Note that in an area characterised by a steep slope the land quality valuation of a farmer
located on the top of a hill cannot be adversely a⁄ected by the emission ￿ows of a farmer
located at the bottom.
6individual farmers to retain production choices unchanged and thus avert pro￿t
losses that compliance with (3) and (4) entails.19 Such a deviation from given
performance standards cannot always be attributed to deliberate actions but
rather sometimes to farmers￿negligence to comply. In any case deliberate and
negligent deviating behaviour can be detected via the realization of a number
of random inspections, given the regulator￿ s inability to inspect simultaneously
the entire population of farmers receiving direct payments.
Such a deviating behaviour can be detected under a certain probability and
further deterred via the principle of cross-compliance, which involves reduction
or even cancellation of provided direct payments by the amounts:
DP1￿( ￿ Qi ￿ Qi) and DP2￿(Lc
i ￿ ~ Lc)
where ￿ 2 [0;1] denotes the reduction rate. The ￿nal reduction of DPs is
proportional to deviations from the constraint constant. Hence the higher the
deviation is, the more evident deliberate noncompliance, justifying the higher
reduction of DPs as foreseen by the 2003 CAP reform.
3 The Farm Model under the CAP Regime as-
sociated with Rural Development




i; ￿ L ￿ Lc
i;‘i)
where ‘ represents either hired or family labor.
Given the environmental requirements incorporated in DP1, the population
of farmers complies with the land quality constraint ￿ Qi by either restricting main
production choices (xij;Lc
i;‘i) or by treating them in an environmentally benign
way via secondary production choices that are disassociated by production but







vector of the secondary production choices established by farmer i, which are
distinguished into:
tx
i Treatments on input usage (i.e. advanced irrigation) reduce the impact
of inputs on emission ￿ ows as if the farmer has employed fewer inputs in
production. Given that @ei
@xij > 0, the vector of vector of e⁄ective input












19The attainment of the land quality target requires the restricted use of inputs xij and /
or of cultivated land Lc, resulting into a reduction in crop yields. Similarly, the attainnment
of the land usage target imposes restrictions on the size of cultivated land, also involving





im) is the vector of undertaken treatments per
unit of input used.
tc
i Treatments of cultivated land (i.e. contour farming, conservation tillage,
terracing) reduce emission ￿ ows as if the farmer had set less land into
production. Given that @ei
@Lc > 0, the e⁄ective land usage in emission
generation is:
Le








i Treatments of set-asided land (i.e. non-fertilised grass strips, hedges,
trees, watercourses, ditches) make set-aside land more e⁄ective in emission
abatement as if the farmer has set aside more land. Given that @ei
@Lnc < 0,
the e⁄ective set-aside land in emission generation is:
Le
nc = (1 + tnc
i )









i Treatments of labour (i.e. vocational training, advisory services) a⁄ect
the impact of labour (‘) on both crop yields and emission ￿ ows. Let ‘e
y be
the e⁄ective labour in crop yields generation and ‘e
e the e⁄ective labour in
emission generation, involving:
‘e




> 0 and ‘e





Even though t‘ is classi￿ed with secondary choices, it is a mixed production
choice a⁄ecting both crop yields and emission ￿ ows.













Treatments involve costs that can either be self-￿nanced fully (TCo






through a rural development (RDi) ￿in the form of a public
VA - involving the granting of subsidies per unit of undertaken treatment. The
associated costs are respectively given:
TCo = rjtx
ij + ￿tnc
i + ctc + dt‘
TCRD = TCo
i ￿ RDi = rj (1 ￿ sx)tx
ij + ￿(1 ￿ snc)tnc





where rj is the vector of the per unit cost of the m input usage treatments and
sx the associated per unit subsidy characterized by 1 > sx > 0, ￿ and snc are
the per unit cost and subsidy of tnc
i , c and sc the per unit cost and subsidy
8of tc
i, while d and s‘ the per unit cost and subsidy of t‘ in the competitive
market. Finally, RDi = rjsxtx
ij +￿snctnc
i +csctc
i +ds‘t‘ represents the amount
of payments provided by Pillar II to the representative farmer i.
RD payments are subject to both performance standards and the cross-
compliance principle, involving a probabilistic reduction (or even cancellation)
of provided rural development payments by the amount:
~ RDp￿
￿ ￿ Qi ￿ Qi
￿
where ~ RD = rjsxtx
ij + ￿snctnc
i + csctc
i = RD ￿ ds‘t‘ given that the aid for
vocational training is not conditional to the land quality constraint.
4 Alternative Behavioral Strategies under the
CMOs CAP Regime
Under a CAP regime involving performance standards and a compliance en-
forcement mechanism, two behavioural rules can be distinguished, depending
on farmers￿attitude towards environmental constraints. If constraints (3) and
(4) enter farmer i￿ s pro￿t maximization problem, then the compliant strategy
is considered, while if the constraints do not enter the problem, the possibility
of noncompliance with environmental standards is considered and the deviating




i = P(1 + s)f(xij;Lc
i) ￿ wjxij + ￿1Lc
i + ￿2
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￿￿ Li ￿ Lc
i
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1 ￿ p￿(~ Lc ￿ Lc
i)
o
20In the absence of farming standards there is no distinction between compliant and deviat-
ing farmer. The maximization problem reduces into: maxx;bF ￿i = P(1 + s)f(xij;Lc
i) ￿
wjxij + DP1 + DP2 , where Pillar I payments (s;￿1;￿2), environmental considerations ￿
￿ Qi; ~ Lc
￿










i ￿ ~ Lc)
o
represent the net percentage
of direct payments provided after the detection of deviation from the imposed
constraints and the enforcement of cross-compliance principle.
The generalized nature of the described CAP regime21 allows the de￿nition
of the di⁄erent CAP regimes via the proper simplifying assumptions. In partic-
ularly, the CAP regimes that can be considered are: 1) unregulated competitive
regime: s = 0 and ￿1;￿2 = 0, 2) full coupling regime: s > 0 and ￿1;￿2 = 0, 3)
partial decoupled regime: s > 0 and ￿1;￿2 > 0, and 4) full decoupled regime:
s = 0 and ￿1;￿2 > 0.
4.1 The Maximization Problem under the Compliant Strat-
egy
Given the production choices of the other farmers, farmer i considers, given the
choices of the rest farmers, the problem (7) and maximizes the Langrangean
function:
L(xij;bF;￿1;￿2) = P(1 + s)f(xij;Lc
i) ￿ wjxij + ￿1Lc
i + ￿2









~ Lc ￿ Lc
i
i
The Kuhn-Tucker necessary conditions of the problem are given by:















= 0 if x￿























￿ ￿1 + ￿2 = 0 if bF










< 0 if bF
i￿ = 0
FOC￿1 : Qi(e1;e2;:::;en) ￿ ￿ Qi = 0 if ￿1 > 0
or Qi(e1;e2;:::;en) ￿ ￿ Qi > 0 if ￿1 = 0
FOC￿2 : ~ Lc ￿ Lc
i￿ = 0 if ￿2 > 0
or ~ Lc ￿ Lc
i￿ > 0 if ￿2 = 0
By the Envelop Theorem the Langrangean multipliers ￿1 and ￿2 express the
marginal cost and bene￿t resulting from a change in the land quality and usage
constraint constant, ￿ Qi and ~ Lc respectively.
21It is the regime of partial decoupling denoted below by the indication (3b).
10Conditions (9) and (10) provide the Nash equilibrium input usage x￿
ij and
set-aside bF
i￿ values under the compliant behavioural rule, assuming that such a




4.2 Pro￿t Maximization under the Deviating Strategy
Under the deviating strategy the Kuhn-Tucker conditions are:
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￿ 2
￿￿ Li ￿ Lc
#
￿￿o







< 0 if bF
i# = 0




i# values under the deviating behavioural rule, as provided by
conditions (11) and (12), are given by:23
x
#
ij(P;wj;s;￿1;￿2;￿;bR; ￿ Qi;p) and bF
#(P;wj;s;￿1;￿2;￿;bR; ￿ Qi;p)
5 The Problem of the Social Planner under the
CMOs Regime





where deviations from an aggregate land quality reference level ￿ QT impose ex-
ternal costs on the society:
D( ￿ QT ￿ QT)
22The su¢ cient conditions for maximum are considered to be satis￿ed.
23It is assumed that the second-order su¢ cient conditions are satis￿ed.







that maximize the net social bene￿t (NSB) from agricul-
tural activities:24
max









i) is aggregate crop yields, F(u) aggregate demand,









For simplicity let Z =
￿ ￿ QT ￿ QT￿
.25
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< 0 if b
f
iSP = 0
de￿ning the socially optimal production choices for the representative farmer i,
which when adopted by the entire population of farmers would result into the
￿rst-best aggregate land quality QT
SP. Condition (15) is assumed to have an in-







marginal productivity of land is too high or if its marginal social damage is too
low, the socially optimum is on the boundaries
￿
i:e: @SW




and any increase in set-aside land reduces social welfare given the land usage
constraint involved by Agenda 2000. To avoid, however, complexities it is as-
sumed that b
f
SP is nonzero, as well as that compliant farmers￿production choices
match with socially optimum choices.27
5.1 Optimal Static CAP Measures associated with CMOs
Under unbounded rationality for the farmers the optimality conditions of the
social planner and the representative deviating farmer de￿ne a system that pro-
vides both the type of CAP measures, as well as the type of correlation between



















be the vectors of the
socially optimal input and set-aside choices respectively of each i = 1;2;:::;n farmer.
25It holds DZ;DZZ > 0, or equivalently DQT < 0 and DQT QT > 0.
26It is assumed that the second-order-conditions are satis￿ed.









12Agenda 2000 measures, which induce the population of deviating farmers to














1 + ￿1 (16)
￿SP
2 [￿2 f1 ￿ p￿Bg ￿ ￿1 f1 ￿ p￿Ag] = ￿(1 + s)￿
#
2 ￿2 (17)
where condition (16) is de￿ned by setting equal the optimality condition (11) of
the unbounded rational deviating farmer and regulator￿ s optimality condition
(14),29 while condition (17) resulted from the equalization of the conditions (12)
and (15).30
To simplify the analysis production choices are restricted into a single input
(x) and the set-aside decision. There is however an indeterminacy in the de￿-
nition of optimal CAP measures. A unique determination of CAP instruments
requires an equal number of production choices and measures. In this case CAP
measures are more than externalities. For instance the optimum coupled pay-



























































The sign of both expressions is uncertain,32 implying that the simultaneous
cancellation of coupled payments and DP1 payment, which means ￿ s = ￿ ￿1 = 0,













2 represent the impact of the social and in-
dividual optimum production choices on crop yields and individual land quality respectively,




























x and ￿2 = DSP
Lc
which at the equilibrium are known and thus treated as parameters. Also, A = h￿
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￿ Li ￿ ~ Lc
￿￿o
.






(14): w = P￿SP
1 + ￿1:
30To do so, both conditions are restructured as, (12) : P =
[￿2 f1 ￿ p￿Bg ￿ ￿1 f1 ￿ p￿Ag]/(1 + s)￿
#




















represent the impact of the social and
individual optimum production choices on crop yields.
32In both expressions the denominators are positive, while the sign of the nominators is
uncertain.























from the adoption of the social optimum input usage value de￿ned in terms of
additional market revenues and retained land usage direct payments equal the



























in terms of foregone market revenues and incurred social damage.
Hence, if both (18) and (19) are zero, the optimum CAP regime is charac-
terised by nonintervention if no set-aside premium is provided (￿2 = 0), while
if ￿2 6= 0 it involves only set-aside premiums. On the other hand, if both (18)
and (19) are nonzero, then depending on the sign of the nominators:
Proposition 2 The optimum CAP regime involves intervention via partially
decoupled measures of the form either of:
i) Premiums (￿ s; ￿ ￿1 > 0) both on crop yields and land usage if both nom-
inators are positive, or
ii) Charges (￿ s; ￿ ￿1 = 0) both on crop yields and land usage if both nomi-
nators are nonpositive.
In the latter case such kinds of penalties are not included in the current
structure of CAP, which implies the possibility of suboptimalities in the policy
design relative to the social optimum aggregate land quality target ￿ QT.
Farmers￿production choices are a⁄ected by a marginal change of a given
CAP instrument, requiring optimal CAP instruments (￿ s; ￿ ￿1) to be analogously
modi￿ed. The type of interdependencies between the optimal CAP pair (￿ s; ￿ ￿1)
and the rest of the instruments of the 1999 reform is assessed, by estimating the












































































































































; R = ￿SP




















14There is interdependence between the optimal coupled payment and land
usage premium, since the impact of a given CAP measure on ￿ s is a⁄ected by
its prior impact on ￿ ￿1. Optimal ￿ ￿1 is negatively correlated to the land usage
constraint constant, while there is complementarity between the optimal pair
(￿ s; ￿ ￿1) and the set-aside premium if










the type of interdependence between the optimal pair of CAP instruments and
the remaining CAP measures cannot be clearly inferred. This implies that
the optimal CAP pair (￿ s; ￿ ￿1) may not always be modi￿ed properly following
changes of CAP measures such as the enforcement mechanism (p;￿), leading to








Hence, to avoid having the regulated population of farmers adopt a sub-
optimal environmental performance diverging from the aggregate land quality
target ￿ QT, the social planner needs to:
Proposition 3 Precommit to the chosen structure of regulatory policy and o⁄er
assurances to regulated agents that he will not change both the optimal CAP pair
(￿ s; ￿ ￿1) and the rest of the CAP elements for a given time period as long as there
is no technological change.
Such a CAP regime is characterised by ￿non-surprise￿features in the sense
that none of the CAP measures is modi￿ed for a given time period.
The socially optimal (￿ s; ￿ ￿2) and (￿ s; ￿ ￿) CAP pairs are respectively determined
for given values of the remaining CAP measures. In particular, the optimum
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The sign of the expression ￿ ￿2 is uncertain,35 implying that the provision of a
set-aside premium may not always be the socially optimal type of intervention.
In particular:
Proposition 4 The optimum CAP regime involves intervention on the basis of
set-asided land of the form of:
i) A premium (￿ ￿2 > 0) either if the denominator is positive or if the
enforcement mechanism of performance standards is insu¢ cient or nonexistent
(p;￿ ￿ 0 or p;￿ = 0)
ii) A charge (￿ ￿2 < 0) if the denominator is nonpositive.
On the other hand, the optimal cross-compliance rate ￿ ￿ resulting from the
optimal CAP pair (￿ s; ￿ ￿) is de￿ned as:36
34The impact of bR on ￿ s is ambiguous. If
￿￿ L ￿ Lc￿
<
￿￿





between the optimal pair and ￿2 is uncertain. Such an uncertain context is also observed
regarding the exact impact of ￿2, ￿ Q
0
i and p (or ￿) on both (￿ ￿1; ￿ s).
35The nominator is positive, while the sign of the denominator is ambiguous.
36The socially optimal inspection probability ￿ p can be equivalently assessed by replacing ￿







































where the sign of the expression ￿ ￿ is uncertain.37 This implies that in the
event of detected non-compliance a proportional reduction of provided DPs
(i:e: ￿ ￿ > 0) may not always be the socially optimal type of intervention. In
particular, if the nominator is equal to zero then no action should be undertaken
to enforce the performance standards since it is socially optimal to proceed in no
reduction of provided direct payments (i:e: ￿ ￿ = 0), while if both the nominator
and denominator are nonzero then:
Proposition 5 The optimum CAP regime involves intervention in the event of
detected non-compliance of the form of:
i) A proportional reduction of provided direct payments (￿ ￿ > 0) if both
the nominator and denominator are positive (or negative).
ii) A proportional increase of provided direct payments (￿ ￿ < 0) if the
nominator and denominator have reverse signs.
Given, however, that measures like a charge on land set-aside (i:e: ￿ ￿2 < 0)
and a nonpositive cross-compliance rate (i:e: ￿ ￿ < 0), are not foreseen by Agenda
2000, the current structure of CAP may not be able to induce the population








the attainment of the social optimum aggregate land quality target is infeasi-ble.
6 Assessment of CAP regimes in a Dynamic Con-
text
In a dynamic context the distinction between unbounded and bounded ratio-
nality is more evident in the employed analytical framework. Under unbounded
rationality the dynamic problem of the social planner is considered to de￿ne the
mechanism for the design of the dynamic socially optimal CAP instruments,
while under the assumption of bounded rational farmers an evolutionary con-
text is employed to assess the policy e⁄ectiveness of Agenda 2000 by de￿ning
the type and range of values of CAP measures inducing the majority or even all
farmers to adopt the compliant strategy.
6.1 Optimal Dynamic CAP Measures associated with CMOs







that maximize the current value of net social bene￿t from
37The sign of both the nominator and denominator is uncertain.
16farming activity subject to a transition equation describing the evolution of
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a concave ￿growth￿function indicating nature￿ s ability to enhance land quality
that attains an interior maximum.38 Note that Z =
￿ ￿ QT ￿ QT￿










where ￿(t) is the dynamic shadow value of the aggregate land quality QT that
is nonnegative (i:e: ￿ > 0).






















































@bf < 0 if b
f
SP = 0
_ ￿ = ￿(r + b) ￿
@D
@Z
_ QT = g(x;LC) + bQT
and the Arrow type transversality condition at in￿nity is:
lim
t!1exp(￿rt)￿(t)QT(t) = 0
Under the assumption that farmers systematically ignore the evolution of
QT (i.e. myopic informational structure)39 the system de￿ning the dynamic
38
Where LC = (Lc
1;Lc
2;:::;Lc
n) is the vector of individual choices regarding land usage. Ag-




39Farmers face a static problem, either (7) or (8), according to the behavioral rule.







1d + ￿1d ￿ ￿’1d (20)
￿SP
2d [￿2 f1 ￿ p￿Bg ￿ ￿1 f1 ￿ p￿Ag] = ￿(1 + s)￿
#
2 f￿’2d + ￿2dg (21)
which is similar to the static system (16) and (17). It is evident that the ex-
pressions of the dynamic and static optimum CAP measures that induce the
population of unboundedly rational farmers to adopt the socially desired pro-
duction choices and thus deliver the desired aggregate land quality level are
identical. The only modi￿cation is the term containing the Hamiltonian multi-
plier (￿) that is zero in the static context.
6.2 Farmers￿Compliance and Dynamic CAP Measures as-
sociated with CMOs
Assume that farmers are subject to dynamic socially optimum CAP measures.
Under bounded rationality farmers have imperfect knowledge about the true
structure of payo⁄s; they choose between the two predetermined strategies (i.e.
compliant and non-compliant strategy) based on individual perceptions and
information revealed via their interaction over time.







are adopted and these farmers com-
ply with the land-quality and land-usage constraints. However, if it is perceived
that the announced enforcement mechanism (p;￿) is not e⁄ective and that the
anticipated inspection probability (pa) and reduction rate (￿a) are either su¢ -




is adopted, stimulating deviation from farming standards. It implies
that:









and the population of farmers is divided into two subgroups, where z is the
proportion of farmers adopting the compliant strategy, while (1 ￿ z) is the de-
viating proportion. Given that farmers learn the true structure of payo⁄s via
their interactions, the proportion of farmers adopting the complying strategy
evolves in time according to the rule of replicator dynamics. Hence, under the
generalized CAP regime the evolution of the compliant strategy is given by:
40Let ￿SP
1d ;￿SP
2d ;￿1d;￿2d;￿1d;￿2d represent the impact of the dynamic social optimum pro-
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is the payo⁄divergence of the compliant and deviating strat-
egy.41
The critical points of (22) provide evolutionary stable fractions of compli-
ant farmers (^ z) It involves a monomorphic steady state characterized either
by full compliance (^ z1 = 1) or full deviation (^ z2 = 0). A polymorphic steady
state characterized by partial compliance (^ z3 2 (0;1)) may also exist if CAP













as can be seen by the stability condition:
d_ z
dz
= (1 ￿ 2z)￿
Given that the social planner￿ s ultimate target is to induce full compli-
ance with farming standards, the stability requirement d_ z
dz j^ z1 = 1 < 0 is sat-
is￿ed if the CAP instruments (s;￿1;￿2;p;￿) are selected to turn the compliant
strategy more pro￿table than the deviating, setting thus the pro￿t divergence
￿(s;￿1;￿2;p;￿) positive. To de￿ne the type and the range of values of the
various CAP instruments that make ￿ nonnegative and stimulated full com-
pliance of the population, the critical values (~ s; ~ ￿1; ~ ￿2; ~ p; ~ ￿) of CAP measures
that set the divergence ￿ equal to zero, along with their marginal impacts on
the expression ￿(~ s; ~ ￿1; ~ ￿2; ~ p; ~ ￿) = 0 are respectively assessed. Two cases are
examined:
Case 1
Consider that both compliant and deviating farmers are myopic and "hard
wired" to their strategy in the sense that the impact of CAP measures on
production choices is negligent. In such a case the type and range of values of
the coupled payment ~ s satisfying the requirement ￿ = 0 is given by:
41Pro￿t divergence consists of four elements: (i) the divergence of market revenues and
coupled payments, (ii) the divergence of input purchase costs, (iii) the divergence of Pro￿t
divergence consists of four elements: (i) the divergence of market revenues and coupled pay-
ments, (ii) the divergence of input purchase costs, (iii) the divergence of DPs, and (iv) the
amount of DPs removed by farmers if found violating farming standards incorporated in direct
payments regime DPs, and (iv) the amount of DPs removed by farmers if found violating
































# ￿ ~ Lc
￿i
.
Given that x￿ < x# and Lc
￿ < Lc
# the expression (24) is negative implying
that compliance of the entire population of farmers is eventually attainable if
s 2 [0; ~ s). If s is set equal to the critical value ~ s then partial compliance (^ z3)
may emerge in the long-run steady state. Then:
Proposition 6 Full compliance of the regulated population emerges if the dy-
namic CAP regime involves:
i) A subsidy on crop yields if ￿1 > ￿2 simultaneously and hold 0 < h
w￿￿







ii) A penalty on crop yields if ￿1 ￿ ￿2.
However, in the case where (23) involves a penalty on crop yields, such an
instrument is not foreseen by the current CAP structure, and the attainment of
the full compliance target is infeasible.
The type and range of values of direct payments (~ ￿1; ~ ￿2) and cross-compliance
reduction rate (~ ￿) inducing full compliance are also assessed involving similar
￿ndings.
Case 2
Farmers￿production choices are a⁄ected by changes in CAP measures, and
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and the replicator dynamic equation (22) is modi￿ed into:
_ z = z (1 ￿ z)
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The type and range of values of given CAP measures satisfying the full com-
pliance requirement ￿(P;w;s;￿1;￿2;￿;bR; ￿ Qi;p) > 0 provide identical expres-
sions to case 1 for the critical values. The expressions describing the marginal
20impact of CAP measures on pro￿t divergence ￿ are altered and depend, among
other things, on the impact of the examined measure on farmers￿production
choices under the alternative strategies. In particular, the impact of the critical
coupled payment ~ s on ￿ = 0 is given by:
d￿(~ s)
ds














































































under both strategies, turning the assessment of the sign of (25) infeasible given
the informational requirements. Furthermore, it is evident that the attainment
of full compliance from a given population of farmers with environmental con-
siderations requires continuous change of the dynamic socially optimal CAP
instruments. However, in practice dynamic CAP measures are neither time in-
variant nor allow for discrete changes over time, leading to suboptimal solutions.
7 Optimal Policy Design under the CAP Regime
associated with Rural Development
Static and dynamic optimality analysis under the assumption of unbounded
rationality, along with evolutionary dynamics analysis under the assumption of
bounded rationality, indicated also that charges on secondary production choices
instead of subsidies may be socially optimal, turning the CAP regime involved
by Mid-term Review (i.e. rural development regime) socially suboptimal. In
each case the type of the social optimal Pillar II CAP instruments, as well as
the type of correlation between the various CAP instruments, is assessed though
the following mechanisms:
7.1 Assessment of Optimal Static CAP Measures associ-
ated with RD
In a static context the social planner seeks to de￿ne the socially optimal equi-












, so that the net social bene￿t from agri-
cultural activities is maximized and thus the ￿rst-best level of aggregate land
quality QT



















are the aggregate costs
associated with secondary production choices, whilst (v‘ =
Pn
i=1 v‘i) the ag-
gregate labour costs.
The optimality conditions of the deviating farmer and the social planner
de￿ne a system, the solution of which provides the type of the socially optimal
CAP instruments, as well as the type of correlation between them, that induce
the representative farmer to adopt the socially optimal production choices. To
simplify analysis the set of production choices of farmer is restricted to three












on the usage of the xij input, while the
rest of the production choices are treated as ￿xed. Thus, the system is given
by:42
P(1 + s)￿ ￿1 +
h
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p￿￿ ￿1￿i~ xSP + rsx f1 ￿ p￿Ag ￿ rsx = ￿1￿i~ xSP (28)
the solution of which de￿nes the type of RD CAP instruments that induce the









sis indicated that the maximization of the social welfare criterion may require
that charges are imposed on farmers instead of farmers being provided subsidies
on given production choices (such as crop yields, land usage and established
input usage treatments). However, given the fact that such charges are not in-
volved in the Agenda 2000 structure, the attainment of the ￿rst-best aggregate
land quality target is infeasible.
7.2 Assessment of Optimal Dynamics CAP Measures as-
sociated with RD
Under the assumption that individual farmers are unbounded rational but do not
take into account the evolution of aggregate land quality QT, the social planner
42Let ￿SP
1 ;￿SP
2 and ￿ ￿1; ￿ ￿2; ￿ ￿1; ￿ ￿2; ￿ ￿3 represent the impact of the social and individual
optimum production choices on crop yields and individual land quality respectively, while
denote the impact of socially optimum choices on social damage. The expressions ￿ ￿3 = QLc
and ￿3 = DLc are both positive and represent the impact of set-aside decision on individual
land quality and social damage respectively.
22aims to de￿ne the optimal path of both main and secondary production choices
so as to maximize the current value of the net social bene￿t from agricultural
activities subject to the evolution of aggregate land quality. The associ-ated
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After following the standard procedure a system similar to the static system
(26) - (28) is obtained, the solution of which provides the type of the dynamic
socially optimum CAP measures.
Under bounded rationality the type and range of values of the socially opti-
mal rural development CAP measures are assessed by employing the evolution-
ary framework, where the associated replicator dynamic equation is:43
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which is similar to the expression (22) de￿ned under the provision solely of
CMOs payments. As expected our analysis indicated that the attainment of
the target of full compliance may not always be feasible since the assessed crit-
ical rural development payments (i:e: sx) may involve penalties on established
treatments, instruments that however are not foreseen by the current CAP
structure.
8 Conclusion
Common Agricultural Policy measures are classi￿ed among the factors responsi-
ble for the imbalance in the agricultural-environment relation. Following wide-
spread criticism, CAP reformers introduced the Agenda 2000 CAP reform that
43The pro￿t divergence between the compliant and deviating strategy is decomposed into
the following elements: (i) the divergence of market revenues and coupled payments, (ii)
the divergence of purchase costs of input and land usage, as well as the establishment and
maintenance costs of treatments, (iii) the divergence of direct payments and provided rural
development subsidies, and (iv) the amount of decoupled payments and rural development
subsidies removed if deviation from the environmental considerations incorporated in direct
payments regime is detected.
23is considered to be pioneering from an environmental aspect. Given that lim-
ited theoretical analysis regarding the environment impacts and the long term
viability of this regime has been undertaken, a conceptual theoretical model of
farming behaviour was developed to embody the basic reforms for the common
market organizations and rural development. The generalized nature of the pro-
vided model allowed the assessement of the policy e⁄ectiveness of Agenda 2000
was evaluated by analysing the problem of optimal regulation of a population of
unboundedly rational agents both in a static and dynamic context, allowing the
assessment of the type of socially optimal Pillar I and Pillar II measures, along
with type of interdependence characterizing them. Finally, the long-run viabil-
ity of the 1999 CAP reform was assessed under the assumption of boundedly
rational agents through the framework of replicator dynamics.
The de￿nition of socially optimal CAP measures associated with CMOs and
RD in both a static and dynamic context indicated that it may be socially
desirable on environmental grounds not only to maintain coupled payments but
also to impose on farmers a set of charges on the various aspects of farming
activity: crop yields, land-usage, set-aside-land and / or secondary production
choices related to emission ￿ ows abatement. Given that such measures are
not foreseen in the current structure of CAP and that the attainment of ￿rst-
best aggregate land quality requires time-￿ exible CAP measures associated with
CMOs and RD, suboptimalities occur and both the e⁄ectiveness and long-run
viability of Agenda 2000 and Mid-term review CAP reforms is doubtful and
depends on existing conditions.
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